WHITE vs. WHITE.

whatever proceedings corporations may see fit to take, I cannot say
that a city may create a nuisance on the lot of a citizen, without
making him any compensation: for the-damages, and then tax him
to abate it.
We were pressed, as courts always are on such occasions, to make
a decision that would avoid the inconveniences resulting from holding the tax illegal. These inconveniences may not be as great as
was supposed. It would not follow from such a decision that those
who had voluntarily paid it could recover it back. But whatever
they may be, I am sure they cannot exceed the evils of holding that
the citizen has no protection against illegal taxation. Courts have
too frequently yielded to such appeals, and to avoid some immediate
inconvenience, have decided cases differentlyffrom what they otherwise would, overlooking the more remote, but at the same time
greater evils of bad precedents in the introduction of a pernicious
principle into the administration of justice.
I think the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining the
sale of his lands for the general tax, which was increased by the
illegal exemption, and for the nuisance tax, but not for the other
assessments, and that the judgment should be reversed, with cQsts.
The judgment is reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

In the Divorce and Matrimonial Cause8 Court.
WHITE vs. WHITE.
The husband will be entitled to the protection of the court, where the wife's passions,.
from whatever cause, are so little under control that she is in the habit of using
personal violence to the husband, from which habit he may be in danger of bodily
injury, though no actual serious injury has been inflicted.

This was a petition for judicial separation, at the suit of the
husband, by reason of the wife's cruelty. It appeared that she was
easily excited by drink, and in that condition had frequently used
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personal violence towards her husband.
been in confinement as insane.

She had also, at times,

The case was argued, in the sittings after Trinity Term, by
T. S'inks, for the petitioner, and
M'undell, for the respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

Dec. 7.-CRESSWELL, J. 0. gave judgment.-I have had considerable difficulty in satisfying my mind as to the decree which
should be pronounced in this case. The principles upon which the
court should proceed are plain enough. They were distinctly stated
by Lord Stowell in Evans vs. Evans, where the wife was petitioner;
and again in Kirkman ys. firkman, 1 Cons. 409, where the
husband sought the protection of the court. In that case Lord
Stowell observed : "The persons of both parties must be protected
from violence; and I cannot accede to what has been said in argument, that the court should not interfere till there has been actual
violence of such a nature as to endanger life. It is not to pause
till a tragical event has taken place; . . . . it is perfectly
clear that there have been words of menace with acts of violence
accompanying them. It is said that they were caused by jealousy.
All the evidence tends to establish that there was no foundation in
the conduct of the husband for feelings of that nature. If such
feelings .were entertained, with or without reason, jealousy is a
passion producing effects as violent as any other passion, and there
will be the same necessity to provide for the safety and comfort of
the individual. If that safety is endangered by violent and disorderly affections of the mind, it is the same in its effects as if it
proceeded from malignity alone; it cannot be necessary that, in
order to obtain the protection of the court, it should be made to
appear to proceed from malignity." In the case now before the
court it appeared that, on many occasions, the husband had been
assaulted by his wife, and had resorted with success to a magistrate
for protection: the extent of the injury done to him was not fully
explained; but on one or two occasions the assaults appeared to be
of a somewhat serious character. Her demeanor was shown to have
been very violent on many occasions, but that violence sometimes
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expended itself in the destruction of her husband's property rather
than in injury to his person. The unhappy woman had been several
times in confinement as an insane person, and I have found it no
easy task to judge how much of her violence towards her husband
was to be ascribed to disease of the mind. Her own account of the
manner in which the disputes between her and her husband arose
was apparently very candid, and perhaps the safest on which the
court can act. According to her evidence she was in the habit of
going out and drinking spirits, not in7 large quantities, but sufficient
to act upon a very excitable temperament. Then she and her
husband began to dispute about trifles, she became gradually more
and more excited until she lost her self-control, and then committed
the violent acts complained of. These quarrels, which occurred
frequently, appear in several instances to have preceded an attack
of insanity, under which, as already observed, the unfortunate
woman has several times labored. As far as I can judge from the
evidence given, I suppose those attacks to have been the consequence, and not the cause of her intemperance and the quarrels
with her husband. The assaults committed upon him were not
proved to have been productive of any serious bodily injury; but
where a woman, either from the effects of drinking, or any other
cause, is entirely without the power of controlling her passion, and
in such a state of mind is in the habit of assaulting her husband, it
is impossible to say that he is not in such danger of bodily injury
as entitles him to the- protection of the court. I therefore feel
bound to pronounce a decree of judicial separation.
Mundell then prayed the court to make some provision for the
wife by an order for permanent alimony. There were but two cases
reported in which a divorce d mensa et thorp had been pronounced
at the suit of the husband for cruelty, so that there could not be
said to be any precedent against what was now asked. It was
clear that the considerations which might have founded the rule of
the Ecclesiastical Courts to make no order for alimony when the
divorce was granted by reason of the wife's adultery, did not apply
to such cases as the present.
But the court, in absence of any precedent in support of the
application, refused to make any order.

